In this article, we examine financial return, answer the question of how one knows when the return is adequate, and explore the relationship of short-and long-term returns as they relate to business health.
Introduction
Does profit mean that a business is achieving an adequate return? This seemingly simple question has a definite answer, but not an easy one. In this article, we examine financial return, answer the question of how one knows when the return is adequate, and explore the relationship of shortand long-term returns as they relate to business health. Obviously, the simplest answer to the above question is that a business achieves ade- 
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1 For publicly traded firms, maximizing shareholder returns is viewed as the primary goal. In that context, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the alignment of owner and manager interests is necessary to reduce agency costs. Several authors, including Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , contend that corporate governance is enhanced, and therefore agency costs are reduced, when corporate ownership is concentrated. Morck and Yeung reach a different conclusion when considering the agency costs in the context of firms controlled by family business groups. They note that "such structures could conceivably give rise to agency problems at least as serious as those known to afflict widely held firms" (2003, p. 379) .
2 A family and its business are interdependent and the decisions affecting one quite clearly affect the other. The head of a family, in Becker's (1974) article, "maximizes a utility function that depends on the consumption of all family members subject to a budget constraint determined by family income and family consumption . . . In this sense, then, a family with a 'head' can be said to maximize 'its' consistent and transitive utility function of the consumption of different members subject to a budget constraint defined on family variables" (1974, pp. 1078-1079) . This analysis can be extended to a family business by applying Becker's concept of "social income," which is "the sum of a person's own income (his earnings, etc.) and the monetary value to him of the relevant characteristics of others" (1974, p. 1063) . Habbershon, Williams, and MacMillan (2003) extend this line of reasoning by constructing "a unified systems model of family firm performance [that] focuses not only on describing stakeholder constituencies and conditions, but also shows how the parts of the system interact to generate idiosyncratic antecedents to firm performance.
[They] begin with a general performance proposition in which the outcome of interest is maximization of the utility function of the family business social system" (2003, p. 454) . They propose that various "arguments that may be included in the metasystem utility function [are] : the income levels of shareholders . . . short-run profit, long-run profit, . . . dividend levels, the quickest sale of the business, and/or long-run wealth accumulation, etc." (2003, pp. 455-456) . Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2003) suggest that Habbershon et al.'s (2003) "approach can be made more widely applicable, without any loss in the force of their arguments, by simply recognizing and allowing
In brief, we show in this article that a business is achieving an adequate financial return if it is meeting or exceeding its weighted average cost of capital, and a business is balancing its short-and long-term returns if it is keeping money in the business in a manner that allows for planned growth while achieving the weighted average cost of capital. 3 We maintain that owners' financial goals are most simply expressed as goals for business growth and goals for business payout.
There are two parts to the cost of capital: the cost of debt and the cost of equity. We begin this article with an exploration of what is arguably the more difficult of the two to define, especially in a privately owned company: the cost of equity. In a private company, one can argue that the cost of equity is quite arbitrary and can take on any value, from one determined using a public company model, to the "gut feel" family members have with regard to the returns they desire from their investment. 4 In their exploration of the "family effect," de Visscher, Aronoff, and Ward (1995) , for example, argue that if family owners are very happy then their expected return drops to nothing.
5
It is clear that the cost of equity has always presented businesspeople with a problem when moving from theory to practice. Even for large, financially sophisticated, publicly traded firms, the cost of equity can have many interpretations.
6
We can imagine the chuckle-or perhaps the anger-coming from John Chambers of Cisco Systems when in 1999 his finance staff gave him a high value for the cost of equity and he was sitting on a P/E ratio of over 200. We suspect he viewed his cost of equity as being miniscule. If he was using stock to finance an acquisition, a case could be made that he was correct because overvalued stock made acquisitions relatively inexpensive, but investors expected exceedingly high returns (reflected in a very high price to earnings ratio), which necessarily means a high cost of equity.
7
Even though the publicly traded firm's cost of Adams, Manners, Astrachan, Mazzola
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for the possibility that family firms will seek to achieve a variety of goals. Transgenerational value creation captures multiple goals and a purpose that transcends profitability, better than wealth creation that really represents the means rather than the ends of family enterprise or enterprising families . . . Put differently, noneconomic considerations will affect both the unique resources and capabilities that lead to distinctive familiness and the pursuit of wealth-creating rents, even in enterprising families, and should be actively incorporated into a theory of family firms" (2003, p. 468) . 3 See Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, pp. 420-436) for a traditional discussion of this concept. 4 Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, p. 449 ) point out that estimating the cost of equity for privately owned firms is difficult because the firm's stock is not publicly traded. Habbershon et al. contend that the interaction of the family unit, the business entity, and individual family members, in a family firm, create an idiosyncratic pool of resources and capabilities and "family-influenced firms may have unique potential for trust f+-, cost of capital f+-, . . . etc., depending upon the specific context of the systemic influences of the family business system" (2003, p. 460) . 5 McConaughy takes the position that "[g]reat family businesses are not content to receive nothing on their investments," which he views as counterintuitive to economic theory and experience (1999, p. 357) . He does argue that "a slight modification of the de Visscher,Aronoff, and Ward model eliminates the extreme solution where the cost of capital goes to 0 (zero) and yet retains the intuition of a family effect." 6 In addition, several methods for determining the cost of equity for a firm exist, including the CAPM, discounted cash flow (DCF), and bond-yield-plus risk premium approaches. See Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002, pp. 424-436) . 7 Brigham and Ehrhardt point out that "P/E ratios are higher for firms with strong growth prospects, other things held constant" (2002, p. 87) . If one uses either a constant growth or nonconstant growth model to estimate the price per share of a firm's stock, assuming the growth prospects of a firm increase, then the price per share increases causing the P/E ratio, ceteris paribus, to increase. Baker and Wurgler find that "in practice, equity market timing appears to be an important aspect of real corporate financial policy. There is evidence of market timing in four different kinds of studies." They go on to state that "analyses of actual financing decisions show that firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when market value is high, relative to book value and past market values, and tend to repurchase equity when the market value is low" (2002, p. 1 
The Cost of Equity
We encourage private company leaders to recognize a simple fact: the cost of equity is generally an expression of the expectations of investors.
Typically in the private company case, the leaders and their family are the owners or equity investors. So we propose that it is their own aspiration levels that yield their cost of equity. These aspiration levels are captured in the goals for the growth of the business and the ability of the business to fund their personal liquid wealth through dividends and other withdrawals. Most leaders have heard the investor's conventional wisdom that "growth firms don't pay dividends." Although this is typically a public company rule of thumb, it is no less true for the nonpublic company. 9 The setting of targets for growth and payout is very interdependent. In our earlier example, a growth target of 20% and a payout target of 60% yielded a very high 50% cost of equity. And it should, since a firm must be enormously profitable to simultaneously achieve both goals over an extended period of time. And, of course, the growth firm paradox may again be in play.
This interdependence in goal setting can to some extent be facilitated by first recognizing that, over the long run, a firm's cost of equity is its ROE! Thus, a firm may set an ROE target, and then employ this target to impose discipline on aspira-
Adams, Manners, Astrachan, Mazzola profits to be retained and reinvested in the business (pay-out rate = 0), then an ROE of 25% would be profitable enough to sustain a 25% annual growth rate in net profit. But since it is hard to eat a growth rate, owners may require some payout of profits. Thus, if the pay-out rate was targeted to be 20%, the firm's 25% ROE would finance that payout and still sustain a 20% annual growth rate in profit. If the leaders targeted a 50% payout, then the 25% ROE could sustain a 12.5% annual growth in profit.
This interdependence of growth and pay-out aspiration levels drives any business, but its ability to facilitate goal setting in a private business is highly significant. Profit growth and profit payout drive family wealth creation-and must be disciplined by levels of profitability grounded in reality. So, in summary, we propose that a firm's cost of equity is defined by its long-term target ROE. This ROE target is interdependently set via the firm's targets for growth and payout tempered by its profit potential.
The Cost of Capital
So far we have been looking only at owners' money as the source of growth and payout.
However, when we add debt to the mix, some important things occur. For one, short-term returns can drop and the business can still meet aspirations for growth and payout so long as the interest rate on debt is covered by these shortterm returns. In other words, we can finance our aspirations with other people's money-debt. This is, of course, where the overall cost of capital becomes important. And just as growth and payout targets are set based on leaders' risk-taking tendencies, so it is with debt. The definition of "prudent" is very personal and very few decisionmakers look at the issuance of debt in quite the same way. 10 We do believe that the choice of debt level can be determined a little more scientifically than owners' risk tolerances. We also believe that the choice of debt is influenced dramatically by our other aspirations as well. As we have demonstrated, our desire for a return on equity affects our ability to pay out funds to owners, which affects our ability to grow, which, in turn, can affect our ability to borrow funds. The simple model in Figure 2 illustrates this.
To build a model that can explain how to balance our numerous financial aspirations and debt, our enterprise must explicitly recognize two other members who require payouts: the first is the lender, whose payout is represented by an interest rate, and the second is the government, whose payout is represented by an income-tax rate.
We now have all the elements necessary for defining the cost of capital. The cost of capital is a weighted average encompassing the cost of equity and the cost of debt. The weights are the proportion of assets financed by equity and the proportion of assets financed by debt. We can therefore introduce the model for the cost of capital.
where CoC = cost of capital, CoE = cost of equity (as before), CoD = cost of debt, D target = the desired proportion of assets to be financed by debt (generally referred to as the debt ratio), and E target = the desired proportion of assets to be financed by equity, or in other words, E target = 1 -
As we earlier defined the cost of equity, we are left with the definition of the cost of debt.
where i = the projected interest rate on debt, and t = the projected income tax rate.
Adams, Manners, Astrachan, Mazzola
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10 Evidence from publicly traded companies suggests "that stock prices play an important role in determining a firm's financing choice. Firms that experience large stock price increases are more likely to issue equity and retire debt than are firms that experience stock price declines. This observation is consistent with the idea that stock price increases are generally associated with improved growth opportunities, which would lower a firm's optimal debt ratio" (Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001, p. 22 ). Matthews,Vasudevan, Barton, and Apana report that "Barton (1989) sought to identify from the owner-manager' experiences and perspectives the personal and situational variables that influence private capital structure decisions . . . Open ended interviews were conducted with CEO's of privately held firms representing a variety of businesses . . . and the findings suggest that beliefs about and attitudes toward debt financing can influence capital structure decisions" (1994, pp. 353-354) . The article also noted that "based on the findings thus far it is posited that capital structure decisions in privately held firms are strongly determined by the preferences, unique experiences, and characteristics of the decision maker (in addition to firm characteristics such as size, nature of business, availability of capital, as so on)" (1994, p. 356) . Anderson and Reeb (2003b) , in the Journal of Law and Economics, find that for S&P 500 firms, " 'family firms' debt levels do not significantly differ from debt levels in non-family firms."
The cost of debt is the interest rate multiplied by 1 minus the tax rate because we do not pay taxes on interest, which means the government subsidizes the assumption of debt. 11 Putting all these components together, the cost of capital can be defined as:
It is exceedingly important for leaders to grasp the notion that each component of the cost of capital is an expectation or aspiration, and that these components should represent a highly interdependent goal-setting process where all goals need to be compromised to make an attainable package of goals. These interdependencies can be observed in Table 1 . One can track the impact of growth and pay-out targets (as before), but also the willing-
ness (or lack thereof) to carry debt. In reviewing the numbers in were only willing to finance assets with 25% debt.
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The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms If, on the other hand, the owners require or expect a 60% payout, then our required rate of return on any investment would rise to 38.5%. This, of course, makes perfect sense-higher aspirations cost money, and that money must generate a high return. However, if we are willing to finance our aspirations by increasing debt, our required return drops accordingly. Thus, if our target debt ratio were set at 50%, our 20% growth with a 60% pay-out scenario could be financed with investments requiring a 27.0% rate of return.
While we have observed that the market the firm serves represents the ultimate disciplinarian, the deployment of a cost of capital that is fundamentally tied to the firm's goals for payout, growth, and debt serves as an excellent source of internal decision-making discipline.
The Profit Engine
We now introduce the most pragmatic of realizations-ultimately, the business has to be managed so that it can stay alive and the most common way to ensure survival is to make money. 13 We make that money by operating the business so as to achieve a competitive position in the marketplace.
For the purposes of this article and for simplicity's sake we propose that the most valid and reliable measure of operating a business effectively is by first defining ROE in a traditional manner (i.e., the short-term ROE).
Using simple algebra, we can then work this more traditional definition into a BEP-driven relation.
Note that we are now defining ROE strictly in terms of ratios (BEP, i, D, t). Further, since we have defined the long-run ROE as and since ROE must equal ROE, we can say that So we are now in a position to specify the level of basic profitability (BEP) to run our growth and level of payout given our willingness to accept risk This relation is illustrated in Table 2 . The interpretation of the data in Table 2 is essentially identical to 
295
The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms 
Employing Cost of Capital for Managerial and Institutional Decision Making
Goal setting is an important job, yet we would be remiss if we did not also address how the cost-ofcapital approach affects managerial and institutional decision making. At the managerial level, we are concerned with more accurately aligning managerial incentives and performance measures with shareholder aspirations. We discuss below one approach to achieve goal and incentive alignment:
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Economic Value Added or EVA®. 14 At the institutional level, we are concerned with determining appropriate levels of debt (debt that is not too risky) and when it is appropriate to depart from the cost of capital approach for making decisions. 
EVA

EVA EBIT t CoC Assets
.
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The Application of Cost-of-Capital Concepts to Private Firms 14 Stern Stewart & Co.'s version of residual income (Stewart, 1991) ."EVA® represents the residual income that remains after the cost of all capital, including equity capital, has been deducted" (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2002, p. 50) . 15 "The concept (of residual income) appeared as early as the 1920's (e.g. in Dupont's bonus plan calculation of its 'Executive Trust Fund'), and has been frequently discussed in management accounting texts since General Electric adopted it in the 1950's" (Christensen, Feltham, & Wu, 2002, p. 2). Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) use a discounted residual income model, a version of the discounted cash flow model, to generate a market implied cost of capital that they assert can be used to estimate the cost of capital for nontraded firms.
community, but we are addressing private companies here). 16 However, the point to be emphasized is that the cost-of-capital framework presented here is very compatible with such contemporary concepts as EVA®. The chief benefit of an EVA® approach is that it aligns managerial incentives with shareholder aspirations by not penalizing managers for long-term decisions. In EVA®, investment decisions (including those for people, marketing, and product development) are accounted for in a manner that does not reduce short-term profitability. (Note that EVA® calculations are made for assessing managerial and firm performance, and not for calculating corporate taxes.)
Managing Financial Risk (Debt)
We have carefully noted how the interdependent goals for payout, growth, and debt have both strategic and emotional components-invariably leading to significant differences in perception among shareholders or an executive team. The pay-out target can be quite emotional, especially as it interacts with the growth target. We have also observed that individual differences in risk tolerance-as measured by the willingness to assume debt-can be enormous. Adams, Manners, Astrachan, Mazzola 298 16 Rogerson demonstrates the importance of setting the depreciation rule "so that the total cost allocated to each period is proportional to the relative productivity of the asset in each period. This rule can therefore be viewed as being consistent with a version of the 'matching principle' from accounting, which states that costs should be allocated across objectives in proportion to the benefits that the costs create across objectives" (1997, p. 773) . 17 Leland points out that "[e]quityholders control the firm's choice of capital structure and investment risk. In maximizing the value of their claims, equityholders will choose strategies that reduce the value of other claimants, including the government (tax collector), external claimants in default, and debtholders. Modigliani and Miller (1963) emphasize the importance of taxes and default costs in determining leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize the importance of bondholders' claims in determining risk. But all claimants must be jointly recognized in the determination of capital structure and investment risk" (1998, p. 1237) . 18 In a privately held firm, when the cost of equity is less than the cost of debt (tax effected), because of owners' aspirations, then no debt makes sense because its use increases the cost of capital and risk. This concept is related to the one expressed in footnote 11.
case is only twice the firm's annual interest payment This relation may be observed in Figure 3 . In this figure, we assume that the firm has adopted an ROE target (and cost of equity) of 25% based on 1986-1991" (2003, p. 276) . They found that operating performance of high cash firms was comparable to or greater than comparable low cash firms (size and industry). They report that "high cash holdings are accompanied by greater investment, particularly R&D expenditures, and by greater growth in assets" (2003, p. 275) . 20 Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) find that "founding family ownership (in S&P 500 firms) reduces the cost of debt financing. Specifically, we find that family firms enjoy a 32 basis point lower cost of debt financing relative to non-family firms." This, of course, supports the idea that founding family ownership reduces agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) , in The Journal of Finance, find that family ownership is prevalent in one-third of S&P 500 firms and accounts for 18% of the outstanding equity of those firms. They also find that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, enjoy both a statistically significantly higher ROA and Tobin's Q values. These results confirm McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, and Mishra's (1998) findings. Anderson and Reeb (2003b) , in the Journal of Law and Economics, find no statistically significant difference in family firms' systematic risk or firm-specific risk relative to nonfamily firms. This result, coupled with family firms' lower cost of debt financing, supports the view that family firms generally have a lower cost of capital than nonfamily firms.
place. However, these frameworks bring some order and rigor to the goal-setting process.
Prudent Departures From the Cost-of-Capital Approach
The cost of capital is a theoretical construct. It is primarily useful in the evaluation of business performance and investment alternatives. These investment opportunities involve forecasts, estimates, and the assumption of operating risks.
Adding plant capacity versus going into a new market does not represent the same accuracy of forecasts or the same level of risk.
Most mature companies have a hierarchical categorization of capital investments that looks something like the following.
1. Regulatory/legal requirements.
2. Essential capital maintenance.
3. Competitive imperative.
4. Profit-adding facilities and equipment.
5. Business expansion.
6. New product/market introduction. 
Summary
Adding rigor and discipline to the goal-setting and decision-making process is greatly facilitated by deploying cost-of-capital concepts. Further, a firm need not be a public corporation in order to apply these techniques. A private firm can attach its cost of equity capital to its level of aspiration as reflected by (1) its goals for growth and payout, (2) its tolerance of debt, and (3) its need for basic earning power. The frameworks and techniques are not abstractions; they represent sound application of basic financial discipline. Finally, these frameworks and techniques force us to understand how interdependent an organization's financial goals are and how that interdependence permeates all financial decision making.
